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NOTES
CHOICE OF LAW STIPULATIONS BY LITIGANTS
American courts almost always honor reasonable contractual provisions
stipulating the law to govern a contract.' Choice of law stipulations made
during litigation, however, have not commanded respect from the courts
1. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7.3C, at 355-56 (1980)
(in United States, parties to contract have power to choose law governing contract); A.
EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 176, at 467-70 (1962) (American law
always has permitted parties to contract to stipulate applicable law). One of the primary methods
by which courts resolve conflicts of law problems in contractual disputes is through the
application of the law stipulated by the parties in a choice of law clause. See A. EHRENZWEIG,
supra, § 176, at 468 (citing bibliographical surveys on use of contractual choice of law
stipulations as method for resolving conflict problems). Courts have long recognized party
autonomy in the choice of law decision. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 588-89
(1953) (in contract disputes, American courts apply body of law parties intended to apply);
Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 448 (1889) (same);
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1955) (same); Blalock v.
Perfect Subscription Co., 458 F. Supp. 123, 126 (S.D. Ala. 1978) (same), aff'd per curiam, 599
F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1979).
The autonomy extended parties in the choice of law to govern contracts, however, is not
without limitation. In determining whether courts should honor a stipulation, courts consider
whether the stipulation is contrary to public policy of the forum. See Fine v. Property Damage
Appraisers, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 1304, 1308 (E.D. La. 1975) (refusing to apply stipulation of
Texas law because applying Texas law would offend Louisiana's public policy against enforcing
agreements not to compete). The forum also may consider the public policy concerns of the
state whose rules of decision would apply absent the stipulation. See Palmer v. Chamberlin,
191 F.2d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 1951) (parties to contract may stipulate governing law if not contrary
to public policy or law of state where parties executed contract or place of performance).
Typically, a stipulation in a contract is enforceable when the parties have made the stipulation
in good faith and when the parties have not intended to avoid otherwise applicable law. See
Travelers Ins. Co. v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 164 F. Supp. 393, 398 (D. Minn. 1958)
(insurer may not contractually stipulate that law of another state governs if resulting contract
is repugnant to law of state where insurance policy issued). The chosen state also must bear
some rational relationship to the transaction underlying the contract. See Farris Eng'g Corp. v.
Service Bureau Corp., 406 F.2d 519, 521 (3d Cir. 1969) (stipulation of New York law significantly
related to transaction since New York was place of contracting); National Union Fire Ins. Co.
of Pittsburgh v. D & L Constr. Co., 353 F.2d 169, 172 (8th Cir. 1965) (stipulation of California
law rejected since bonding agreements central to dispute had no ties to California), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 941 (1966).
Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws recognizes the validity of
choice of law stipulations, but distinguishes between matters that the parties could have
determined by explicit agreement and those that the parties could not have resolved by an
explicit provision in their contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187
(1971). When the parties to a contract choose a body of law solely to govern the interpretation
or construction of the contract, courts do not restrict the parties' choice. See id. § 187(1); see
also E. SCOLEs & P. HAY, CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 18.3, at 637 n.l (1982) (citing cases recognizing
unrestricted freedom of parties to choose law interpreting or construing terms of contract). The
rule permitting parties to a contract to stipulate the law to govern the interpretation or
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with similar consistency. 2 The Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Twohy v.
First National Bank of Chicago3 gave effect to a choice of law stipulation
made during the pretrial stage. 4 The Twohy case raises the interesting and
novel question of whether courts should extend the autonomy that parties
exercise in selecting the applicable law of a contract to tort cases and to
contract cases in which the parties agree to the applicable law after the
initiation of litigation.s
construction of the contract allows the parties to incorporate by reference terms of their
contractual engagements. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 187 comment c
(1971). If the choice of law will govern issues of contractual capacity, formalities or substantial
validity, courts will honor the stipulation only if the chosen state is related substantially to the
transaction and application of the law of the chosen state is not contrary to a fundamental
policy of the state whose law would govern absent the stipulation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment d (1971). American courts have adopted the view of the
Restatement. See, e.g., Action Eng'g v. Martin Marietta Aluminum, 670 F.2d 456, 459 (3d Cir.
1982) (citing Restatement as support in upholding stipulation of California law since issue of
whether good faith or reasonableness standard governed termination of contract was proper
subject of explicit stipulation in contract); Blalock v. Perfect Subscription Co., 458 F. Supp. at
127 (following Restatement in refusing to give effect to stipulation of Pennsylvania law because
covenant not to compete was contrary to fundamental public policy in Alabama); Stauffer
Chem. Co. v. Keysor-Century Corp., 541 F. Supp. 234, 238-39 (D. Del. 1982) (citing Restate-
ment, contractual stipulation of Connecticut law honored despite objection by one party at
trial).
2. Compare Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding litigants'
stipulation at oral argument that Wisconsin law applied) and Johnson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577
F. Supp. 174, 175 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (upholding parties stipulation in court that New York law
applied) with Ezell v. Hayes Oilfield Constr. Co., Inc., 693 F.2d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 1982)
(rejecting parties' pretrial stipulation that Mississippi law governed), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 79
(1983) and System Operations Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1136-37 (3d
Cir. 1977) (rejecting litigants' attempt to stipulate that general common law principles would
govern).
3. 758 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1985).
4. Id. at 1190-91; see infra notes 26-47 and accompanying text (discussing Twohy and
Seventh Circuit's acceptance of litigants' choice of law stipulation).
5. 758 F.2d at 1190. Courts and commentators have noted the absence of cases and
writings concerning litigants' choice of law stipulations in the United States. See Lloyd v.
Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting absence of cases considering tort litigants'
choice of law stipulations); System Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d
1131, 1137 n.4 (3d Cir. 1977) (finding no decision in any state allowing litigants to stipulate
governing law); A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 1, at 469-70 (noting that theoretical foundation
supporting litigants' choice of law stipulations rarely has been topic of discussion in United
States); 1 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 2:1, at 190-91
(1983) (commenting on lack of decisions addressing validity to tort litigants' choice of law
stipulations). Recently, the Eleventh Circuit encountered a choice of law stipulation proffered
by litigants and was uncertain on the stipulation's validity. See Menendez v. Perishable Distribs.
Inc., 744 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1984), ctfd. ques. ans., 254 Ga. 300, 329 S.E.2d 149, ans.
conformed to, 763 F.2d 1374 (1985). Unable to ascertain whether Georgia courts would enforce
litigants' choice of law stipulations, the Eleventh Circuit in Menendez certified the question to
the Georgia Supreme Court. See 744 F.2d at 1553. Because of the Georgia Supreme Court's
responses to two additional questions certified by the Eleventh Circuit, the Georgia Supreme
Court found the question concerning the validity of litigants' choice of law stipulations moot
and, therefore, did not answer the Eleventh Circuit's certified question. See Menendez v.
Perishable Distribs. Inc., 254 Ga. 300,-_, 329 S.E.2d 149, 152 (1985).
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For many years American courts have permitted the parties to a contract
to choose the law that will govern disputes arising from the contractual
relationship and to incorporate that choice of law in the contract. 6 The
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws7 as well as the Uniform Commer-
cial Code8 recognize choice of law stipulations when the parties have included
the stipulation in the contract. 9 Other countries similarly recognize party
autonomy in the choice of law applicable to a contract.'0 Accordingly, choice
of law clauses are common in modern contracts" and often permit courts to
forego complex analyses under varying choice of law formulas.
2
6. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 588-89 (1953) (courts will apply law
parties intended to apply unless forbidden by public policy); Sarlot-Kantarjian v. First Penn-
sylvania Mortg. Trust, 599 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1979) (courts will respect contractual choice
of law provisions unless chosen state is not related substantially to parties or transaction, or
chosen state's laws would be contrary to fundamental policies of forum state); Siegelman v.
Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1955) (courts will permit parties' choice
of law to govern validity of contract if parties' choice bears some relation to place of making
or performance of contract and if parties stipulated to choice of law in good faith); National
Sur. Corp. v. Inland Properties, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 173, 188-89 (E.D. Ark. 1968) (contractual
stipulation to choice of law honored only if chosen state has substantial connection with
contract), aff'd, 416 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1969).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971); see supra note 1 (discussing
Restatement's limitations on contractual choice of law stipulations).
8. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1978). Section 1-105(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides
that when a transaction reasonably is related to the forum state and also to another state or
nation, the parties may agree that the law of either state or nation shall govern their rights and
duties. Id. If the parties do not stipulate a choice of law, the Uniform Commercial Code applies
as adopted by the forum state, as long as the transaction bears an appropriate relation to the
forum state. Id. See generally Nordstrom, Choice of Law and the Uniform Commercial Code,
24 OHIo ST. L.J. 364, 372-74 (1963) (discussing Uniform Commercial Code § 1-105 as adopted
in Ohio).
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment a (1971) (parties to
contract may include choice of law clause in contract since choice of law clause is best method
of protecting parties' expectations); U.C.C. § 1-105 comment 1 (1978) (parties have right to
stipulate in contract law applicable to multistate transaction).
10. See generally A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 1, at 470 (concluding that countries around
the world honor contractual choice of law stipulations that are not violative of public policy);
2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 370-76 (2d ed. 1960) (discussing
party autonomy in selecting applicable law with reference to foreign statutes); G. DELAUME,
TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS, Law and Practice, booklet 8, at 2-4 (1983) (concluding that parties
to transnational contracts enjoy extensive freedom in selecting applicable law); Yntema, "Au-
tonomy" in Choice of Law, I Am. J. Comp. L. 341, 345-52 (1952) (discussing foreign courts'
acceptance of choice of law autonomy and foreign statutory provisions permitting contractual
choice of law clauses).
11. See generally 2 E. RABEL, supra note 10, at 378 (asserting that parties are utilizing
express choice of law stipulations in ever increasing types of contracts); A. EHRENZWEIG, supra
note 1, at 468 (express choice of law stipulations are becoming one of primary means of
resolving conflicts of law problems).
12. See James, Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on Conflict of Laws Contracts,
36 CH. KENT. L. REV. 34, 57 (1959) (choice of law stipulations are less burdensome on courts
than traditional choice of law formulas); Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d at
189, 195 (2d Cir. 1955) (courts should view choice of law stipulations as reducing litigation
rather than usurping function of legislature).
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Important policy considerations underlie the stature of contractual choice
of law stipulations. 3 Permitting the parties to a contract to select the law
that will govern their contract protects the parties' expectations 4 and pro-
motes a sense of certainty in commercial transactions.'" Choice of law
stipulations incorporate into the contract a body of law that provides
guidelines by which the parties may conduct a course of business.' 6 In
addition, choice of law stipulations relieve courts of the time consuming and
costly exercise of resolving ambiguities in parties' intentions concerning rights
and obligations under the contract.
7
Although choice of law clauses have become quite common, many
contracts still do not contain choice of law provisions.'8 One reason for the
absence of choice of law provisions in contracts is that parties entering a
contract may believe that a choice of law clause is "not necessary. 9 The
parties may not realize fully the conflicts that may arise under the contract
until long after the execution of the contract when litigation is pending.20
13. See infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (discussing certainty and predictability
gained in contracts through choice of law clauses).
14. See Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (allowing
parties to choose governing law better protects parties' expectations under contract than rule
that law of state where parties executed contract applies); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 187 comment e (1971) (choice of law stipulations promote certainty and predictability
in contracts); E. ScOLES & P. HAY, supra note 1, at 632 (same).
15. See Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1955) (courts
accept choice of law clauses in contracts primarily to avoid conflicts of law problems and to
promote contractual certainty); Nordstrom, supra note 8, at 367 (acceptance of choice of law
clauses allows parties to predict applicable law used to determine rights and duties under
contract); Reese, Power of Parties to Choose Law Governing Their Contract, 1960 PROC. AM.
Soc. INT'L L. 49-50 (conventional choice of law analysis does not promote certainty and
predictability in contract cases).
16. See Nordstrom, supra note 8, at 367 (choice of law stipulations in contracts provide
parties predictability in rights and duties governing transaction at execution of agreement).
17. See Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1955) (choice
of law stipulations allow courts to avoid conflicts of law problems and therefore reduce
litigation); El Hoss Eng'g & Transp. Co. v. American Indep. Oil Co., 183 F. Supp. 394
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (choice of law agreements reduce litigation and relieve courts of problems of
resolving ambiguities in parties intentions), rev'd on other grounds, 289 F.2d 346, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 837 (1961).
18. E.g., Ezell v. Hayes Oilfield Constr. Co., Inc., 693 F.2d 489, 492 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982)
(no choice of law clause included in contract), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 79 (1983); Tannerfors v.
American Fidelity Ins. Co., 397 F. Supp. 141, 144-45 n.4 (D.N.J. 1975) (same) aff'd 535 F.2d
1247 (3d Cir. 1976); El Hoss Eng'g & Transp. Co. v. American Indep. Oil Co., 183 F. Supp.
394, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (same), rev'd, 289 F.2d 346, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961); see G.
DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS § 2.04, at 18 (1982) (parties to contract often fail to
include choice of law clause in contract believing no conflicts of law problems exist under
contract).
19. G. DELAUME, supra note 18, at 18 (parties engaged in swift commercial transactions
may not give much thought to choice of law clause or may assume conflicts problems adequately
addressed elsewhere in contract).
20. See id. (emphasizing effects of time constraints on perception of potential conflicts in
contract).
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The initial question in determining if the parties to a contract may stipulate
to the applicable law while litigation is pending is whether the policies
justifying judicial adherence to contractual stipulations also support choice
of law stipulations made subsequent to the execution of a contract. 21 The
Seventh Circuit recently concluded that since courts honor the parties' choice
of law when included in the contract, courts also should honor choice of
law stipulations made while litigation is pending.? The Fifth Circuit 23 and
the Third Circuit, 24 however, have reached the opposite conclusion, holding




In Twohy v. First National Bank of Chicago,26 the Seventh Circuit
extended party autonomy in choice of law to the postdispute stage.27 In
Twohy, the majority shareholder in a Spanish corporation alleged breach
of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, and libel on the part of the defendant,
First National Bank of Chicago (First Chicago). 28 The plaintiff claimed that
First Chicago failed to provide financing to the corporation pursuant to an
alleged loan agreement and that First Chicago issued libelous reports to the
corporation's prospective clients and to other potential lenders. 29
After having responded to the plaintiffs' complaint in Twohy, First
Chicago filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 30 The bank claimed
that Twohy, as a private person and shareholder, lacked standing to assert
a claim for damages to the corporation.3 ' First Chicago attached to its
21. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (discussing policies underlying acceptance
of contractual choice of law clauses).
22. See Twohy v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 758 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1985)
(upholding choice of law stipulations by litigants); see also infra notes 26-47 and accompanying
text (discussion of Twohy).
23. See Ezell v. Hayes Oilfield Const. Co., Inc., 693 F.2d 489, 492 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982)
(rejecting litigants' choice of law stipulation), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 79 (1983); see also infra
notes 49-59 and accompanying text (discussion of Ezell). But see Calloway v. Manion, 572 F.2d
1033, 1036 (5th Cir. 1978) (upholding litigants' choice of law stipulation); infra notes 60-69 and
accompanying text (discussion of Calloway); infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (compar-
ing Ezell and Calloway decisions).
24. See Consolidated Water Power & Paper Co. v. Spartan Aircraft Co., 185 F.2d 947,
949 (3d Cir. 1950) (rejecting litigants' choice of law stipulation); see also infra notes 74-82 and
accompanying text (discussion of Consolidated Water).
25. See Ezell, 693 F.2d at 492 n.2 (rejecting litigants' choice of law stipulations);
Consolidated Water, 185 F.2d at 949 (rejecting litigants' choice of law stipulation).
26. 758 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1985).
27. Id. at 1191 (upholding litigants' choice of law stipulation).
28. Id. at 1187. In Twohy v. First National Bank of Chicago, a Spanish corporation was
engaged in the business of producing and installing beverage dispensing machines in Spain. Id.
The corporation sought additional funds to expand its business to other locations. Id. The
corporation claimed that First National Bank of Chicago pulled out of a loan agreement and
began a campaign of issuing negative reports to other banks and resorts for whom the
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motion for judgment on the pleadings affidavits of Spanish attorneys assert-
ing that under Spanish conflict of law rules, Spanish law governed the
actions. 32 The affidavits further provided that under Spanish law, a person
does not have standing to bring an action based on a transaction involving
a corporation of which the person is a shareholder.33 Twohy's answer also
included affidavits from Spanish attorneys supporting the conclusion that
Twohy had stated a valid personal action under Spanish law.3 4 At the hearing
on First Chicago's motion, 35 the judge asked both parties whether they had
agreed that the law of Spain would govern the substantive issues of the
case.3 6 Both parties responded in the affirmative.317 The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that under Spanish law no
genuine issue of material fact existed, and that the defendant was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
3 8
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the
plaintiff's claim as required under Spanish law.39 The Twohy court adhered
to the procedural rule that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction
must look to the choice of law rules of the forum state.40 The law of Illinois,
the forum state, recognized the enforceability of a choice of law stipulation
32. Id.
33. Id. In Twohy, an affidavit attached to the defendant's motion for judgment on the
pleadings asserted that under Spanish law, the plaintiff, as a shareholder, lacked standing to
sue for damages to the corporation, but the affidavit cited no authority in support of that
conclusion. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The Twohy court initially denied the defendant's motion for judgment on the
pleadings. Id. at 1188. The hearing at which the judge asked both parties to affirm the choice
of law stipulation was a rehearing on the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Id.
36. Id. at 1188.
37. Id.
38. Id. In Twohy, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint in the district court asserting
that Spanish law was inapplicable. Id. at 1189. The plaintiff contended that the attorney who
had made the stipulation was only the plaintiff's local counsel and was neither familiar with
the legal issues of the case nor authorized to make the stipulation on the plaintiff's behalf. Id.
at 1189-90. Twohy further argued that at all times he intended to bring the action under the
laws of the United States. Id. at 1189. The district court rejected the plaintiff's arguments,
finding that the use of the term "local counsel" was misleading because the attorney representing
Twohy at the hearing was the only counsel of record and because nothing indicated any
limitation on the attorney's authority to act on behalf of the plaintiff. Id. at 1190. The district
court also noted that the plaintiff never suggested during the course of the litigation that
Spanish law might be inapplicable. Id. The district court also found inaccurate the plaintiff's
assertion that affidavits attached to the plaintiff's answer to the defendant's motion for summary
judgment clearly established an intent to bring the action under the laws of the United States.
Id.
39. Id. at 1191.
40. See id. at 1189. When a federal court exercises diversity jurisdiction, the court must
look to the choice of law rules of the forum state to determine the applicable law. See Klaxon
v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941) (finding that Erie doctrine necessitates
that federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction apply forum's choice of law rules); Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (federal courts exercising diversity or pendent jurisdiction
must apply the law of the forum state).
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embodied in a contract, but did not address choice of law stipulations made
during the course of litigation. 41 Although acknowledging that decisions in
other circuits had found litigants' choice of law stipulations no more binding
than stipulations pertaining to the scope or meaning of the law, 42 the Twohy
court attempted to distinguish litigants' choice of law stipulations.
43
The Seventh Circuit cited two district court decisions that upheld liti-
gants' choice of law stipulations." The Twohy court ruled that, similar to
stipulations that are included in a contract, Illinois courts would honor
choice of law stipulations made while litigation is pending provided that the
stipulations do not violate public policy or destroy the court's subject matter
jurisdiction. 45 The Seventh Circuit found the parties' stipulation of Spanish
law to be effective since the law of Spain bore a significant relationship to
the parties and to the dispute." To reinforce its decision, the Seventh Circuit
41. 758 F.2d at 1190. In Twohy, the Seventh Circuit noted that Illinois courts recognize
the enforceability of choice of law clauses in contracts. Id. (citing Keller v. Brunswick Corp.,
54 Ill. App. 271, 275, 369 N.E.2d 327, 329-30 (1977) and Carter v. Catamore Co., 571 F. Supp.
94, 95 (N.D. Il1. 1983)).
42. Id. at 1190-91. The Twohy court cited the Fifth Circuit's decision in Ezell v. Hayes
Oilfield Construction Co., and the Third Circuit's decision in Consolidated Water & Power Co.
v. Spartan Aircraft Co. as taking a position contrary to the Seventh Circuit's finding that choice
of law stipulations differed in effectiveness from stipulations to the content or meaning of the
law, and denying effect to choice of law stipulations by litigants. Id.; Ezell, 693 F.2d 489 (5th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 79 (1983); Consolidated Water, 185 F.2d 947 (3d Cir. 1950);
see infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text (discussion of Ezell); infra note 74-82 and
accompanying text (discussion of Consolidated Water).
43. 758 F.2d at 1190-91. The Twohy court distinguished choice of law stipulations from
stipulations coficerning the meaning or content of the law, which the Seventh Circuit concluded
were clearly ineffective. Id. The Seventh Circuit previously had concluded in another decision
that stipulations concerning the meaning or content of the law are ineffective because the
stipulations do not promote the judicial function of precedent production. See Lloyd v. Loeffler,
694 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir. 1982) (distinguishing stipulations on content of law in upholding
tort litigants choice of law stipulation); infra notes 102-24 and accompanying text (discussion
of Lloyd). Other courts similarly have found stipulations concerning the content or meaning of
the law wholly ineffective. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry., 243 U.S. 281, 289
(1917) (stipulations concerning legal effect of admitted facts are inoperative); Hegeman-Harris
& Co. v. United States, 440 F.2d 1009, 1012 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (courts not bound by parties'
stipulation concerning legal effect of contract); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Neill, 79
Idaho 385,-., 319 P.2d 195, 198 (1957) (stipulation that bonds have no relation to plaintiff's
business in forum state is ineffective because matter stipulated would be conclusion of law);
State ex rel. Weldon v. Thomason, 142 Tenn. 527,-, 221 S.W. 491, 495 (1920) (meaning of
statutory language was not proper subject of parties' stipulation).
44. 758 F.2d at 1191; see Robbins v. Ogden Corp., 490 F. Supp. 801, 806 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (litigants' choice of law stipulation effective since chosen law reasonably related to
transaction); Tannerfors v. American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 397 F. Supp. 141, 144-45 n.4
(D.N.J. 1975) (improper to relieve litigants of choice of law stipulation when neither objected
to rules of decision until after trial).
45. 758 F.2d at 1191; see infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (discussing manner
in which courts may lose subject matter jurisdiction if courts give effect to parties' choice of
law stipulations).
46. Id. at 1191 n.2. The Twohy court found that the choice of Spanish law was reasonable
on the basis that the parties dealt with each other in Spain, the parties executed the alleged
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noted that allowing the plaintiff to back out of the stipulation of Spanish
law maintained steadfastly throughout the litigation would result in unfair-
ness to First Chicago and a waste of judicial resources.47
While the Seventh Circuit in Twohy was concerned with the inequity
and inefficiency of allowing a party to escape a choice of law stipulation, 48
the Fifth Circuit in Ezell v. Hayes Qilfield Construction Co. 49 refused to
give effect to a choice of law stipulation proffered by litigants despite
application of the chosen law in the district court.50 In Ezell, an employee
injured himself in the course of his employment and brought a Jones Act
claim5 against his employer.12 When the employer's insurer failed to defend
the claim, the employer joined the insurance company as a third party
defendant. 3 Based upon a pretrial stipulation by all the litigants, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana applied Mississippi
law to the employer's third party complaint against the insurer for failure to
defend the employer in the employee's Jones Act clam. 54 The jury found for
the employee and awarded punitive damages to the employer based on the
insurance company's failure to defend the suit.55
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the insurance company asserted that
Louisiana law should apply, despite the parties' stipulation at trial that the
court shoula apply Mississippi law.5 6 Although avoiding the need to rule
directly on the issue 5 7 the Fifth Circuit noted that Louisiana choice of law
rules allow parties to agree contractually to the law that will govern disputes
loan agreement in Spain, the contract was performable in Spain, and the plaintiff allegedly
sustained injury in Spain. Id.
47. Id. at 1191; see infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text (discussing binding effect
of choice of law stipulations honored by courts).
48. 758 F.2d at 1191.
49. 693 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 79 (1983).
50. Id. at 492 n.2.
51. Id. at 491. In Ezell v. Hayes Oifield Construction Co., the plaintiff brought suit
against his employer under the Jones Act. Id.; see 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982). The Jones Act
provides that a seaman injured in the course of his employment may maintain an action for
damages at law against his employer. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
52. 693 F.2d at 491.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 492.
55. Id. at 491. In Ezell, the jury awarded the employer $2,000,000 in punitive damages
in the employer's action against the insurance company for failure to defend against an
employee's suit. Id. The district court reduced this amount to $500,000 by remittitur. Id. Both
the insurance company and the employer appealed the decision of the district court to the Fifth
Circuit. Id.
56. Id. at 492. The insurance company in Ezell argued that the forum's choice of law
rules should apply and that the forum state's choice of law rules required application of
Louisiana law. Id.
57. See id. The Ezell court determined that Louisiana and Mississippi case laws were
identical on the issue of punitive damages for failure to defend. Id. Louisiana and Missisippi
case laws also were identical on the issue of when a conflict of interest justifies an insurer's
failure to defend a suit against a policy holder, since both states' case laws were void of any
decisions on point. Id. Because of the similarity in Mississippi and Louisiana case laws, the
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arising out of the contract." Since the parties had stipulated during the
pretrial stage that Mississippi law would apply, however, the Fifth Circuit
found the stipulation no more binding on the court than a stipulation
pertaining to the content of Louisiana law.5 9
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Ezell arguably conflicts with its earlier
decision in Calloway v. Manion.60 In Calloway, the plaintiff brought an
action alleging breach of warranty and misrepresentation by the defendant
in connection with an exchange of horses. 6' The parties exchanged horses in
Illinois, the domicile of the defendant, and the plaintiff trailered a mare
back to his home state of Texas. 62 The plaintiff brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas when the plaintiff
discovered that the mare was unfit.6 3 At trial, the parties agreed that the
Texas Uniform Commercial Code governed the transaction." Applying Texas
law, a jury found that the plaintiff contractually had limited his remedy to
an exchange for another horse and denied the plaintiff rescission of the
contract.
65
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the plaintiff in Calloway argued that the
sections of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code which authorized contrac-
tual restrictions of remedies did not preclude a remedy of rescission based
upon misrepresentation. 66 The Calloway court recognized that a federal court
must apply the forum's choice of law rules when exercising diversity juris-
diction. 67 Section 1-105 of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code permits
parties to a contract to agree on the governing law provided that the state
whose law the parties chose bears a reasonable relation to the transaction.
68
The Fifth Circuit explained that although the choice of law rule set out in
the Uniform Commercial Code referred generally to predispute agreements,
court did not make a choice of law. Id. The Ezell court determined that general principles of
insurance law applied to the issues in dispute. Id.
58. Id. at 492 n.2. The Ezell court found that Louisiana allows parties to agree contrac-
tually concerning the law applicable to disputes under a contract. Id. (citing Associated Press v
Toledo Inv., Inc., 389 So.2d 752, 754 (La. Ct. App. 1980) and Davis v. Humble Oil & Ref.
Co., 283 So.2d 783, 788 (La. Ct. App. 1973)).
59. Id.; cf. supra note 43 and accompanying text (distinguishing choice of law stipulations
from stipulations on content or meaning of law).
60. 572 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1978).
61. Id. at 1035.
62. Id. at 1036.
63. Id. at 1035.
64. Id. at 1036; see TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Art. 2 (Vernon 1968) (governing sales).
65. 572 F.2d at 1035.
66. Id. at 1036; see TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.316, 2.718, 2.719 (Vernon 1968)
(governing exclusion or modification of warranties and remedies).
67. 572 F.2d at 1036; see supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing rule of Klaxon.)
68. Id.; see TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105 (Vernon 1968) (governing parties'
power to choose applicable law); see also Tuchler, Boundaries to Party Autonomy in the
Uniform Commercial Code: A Radical View, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 180 (1967) (discussing section
1-105 of Uniform Commercial Code); Nordstrom, supra note 8, at 365-68 (discussing choice of
law clauses under Section 1-105 of Uniform Commercial Code).
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the Calloway court saw no reason to question the litigants' stipulation since
the choice of law bore a reasonable relation to the transaction.
69
The Fifth Circuit's decisions in Calloway and Ezell appear contradictory
because the Calloway court honored a choice of law stipulation of the
litigants70 whereas the Ezell court refused to consider the parties' choice of
law stipulation because the parties proffered the stipulation after the dispute
arose. 71 The Fifth Circuit may have allowed the stipulation in Calloway
because Illinois, the state whose laws might apply absent the stipulation to
Texas law, had adopted the Uniform Commercial Code in substantially
similar form.7 2 Affording the Calloway litigants' choice of law stipulation
any weight, however, is inconsistent with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Ezell,
which found that litigants' choice of law stipulations were wholly ineffec-
tive.
73
In accord with Ezell is the Third Circuit's decision in Consolidated Water
Power & Paper Co. v. Spartan Aircraft Co. 74 In Consolidated Water, a
paper company brought suit to recover the unpaid balance of the purchase
price of floor covering sold to Spartan Aircraft.7 1 Consolidated Water, a
Wisconsin corporation with its principal place of business in Wisconsin, and
Spartan Aircraft, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
in Oklahoma, stipulated in the United States District Court for the District
of Delaware that Wisconsin law would govern the breach of warranty issues
in the case and that Oklahoma law would control the claim of fraud. 76 The
69. 572 F.2d at 1036. In Calloway v. Manion, the plaintiff traveled from his home state
of Texas to Illinois to exchange a horse for a mare. Id. Upon returning to Texas with the mare,
the plaintiff discovered that the mare had an incipient ovary condition that caused the horse to
injure its hock. Id. at 1035. The Fifth Circuit found upon these facts that the parties' choice
of Texas law was reasonably related to the transaction. Id. at 1036.
70. See id. at 1036; see also supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text (discussion of
Calloway).
71. See 693 F.2d at 492 n.2; see also supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text (discussion
of Ezell).
72. See 572 F.2d at 1036. In Calloway, the Fifth Circuit applied Texas law, as stipulated
by the litigants in the district court. Id. Absent the stipulation, Illinois law might have governed
the dispute since Illinois was both the situs of the transaction and the defendant's state of
domicile. Id.; see Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. 1967) (law of place of
performance governs contract executed in one jurisdiction but performable in another jurisdic-
tion). Since both Illinois and Texas had adopted the Uniform Commercial Code in substantially
similar form, however, the court may have found no need to distinguish between the laws of
the two states. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26 (1973); TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. Art. 2 (Vernon
1968).
73. See 693 F.2d at 492 n.2 (litigants' choice of law stipulations are not binding on court);
notes 49-59 and accompanying text (discussion of Ezell).
74. 185 F.2d 947 (3d Cir. 1950).
75. Id. at 949-50. In Consolidated Water, Spartan Aircraft Co., a manufacturer of
trailers, contracted with the plaintiff to purchase floor covering. Id. Spartan Aircraft made
several orders for floor covering, but later gave notice of cancellation on an undelivered portion
of an order. Id. at 950. The plaintiff sued for the unpaid portion of the order, and Spartan
Aircraft defended on claims of breach of warranty and deceit in the insulating characteristics
of the floor covering. Id.
76. Id. at 949.
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district court honored the choice of law stipulation, 77 but the Third Circuit
refused to bind itself to the parties' choice of law even though the choice of
law would not affect the outcome of the case. 7 The Third Circuit found
that Delaware conflict of law rules permit the parties to stipulate in a contract
the laws to govern disputes arising out of the contract.7 9 The parties in
Consolidated Water, however, stipulated the choice of law after the initiation
of litigation.80 Finding no decisions recognizing a choice of law stipulation
proffered after litigation had begun, the Third Circuit rejected the parties'
stipulation.81 In addition, the Third Circuit commented that a court likely
would not honor a choice of law stipulation proffered after litigation had
begun.
8 2
Other circuits have encountered litigants' choice of law stipulations in
contract cases and have honored the stipulations without discussing the
validity of litigants' choice of law stipulations. 3 Although American courts
have not discussed extensively the policies supporting the decision to accept
or reject litigants' choice of law stipulations in contract cases,8 4 obvious
77. Id.
78. Id. The Third Circuit in Consolidated Water determined that the outcome of the case
did not depend on the choice of law. Id. Because an Oklahoma statute on innocent misrepre-
sentation did not become operative on the facts of the case, the Third Circuit found that the





83. See Rich v. Clayton Mark & Co., 250 F.2d 622, 623 (8th Cir. 1957); Wells v. J.C.
Penney Co., 250 F.2d 221, 225 (9th Cir. 1957); Hulme v. Sweetman Constr. Co., 230 F.2d 66,
68 (10th Cir. 1956). The Eighth Circuit allowed litigants to stipulate the applicable law in Rich
v. Clayton Mark & Co. See Rich, 250 F.2d at 627. In Rich, Clayton Mark & Co., an Illinois
company, brought an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri to recover the unpaid purchase price from the guarantors of a sale of steel tubing to
a Missouri corporation. Id. The litigants agreed that the law of Illinois controlled the action,
and the Eighth Circuit honored the parties' stipulation. Id.
Likewise, in Wells v. J.C. Penney Co., the Ninth Circuit considered a choice of law
stipulation in an action brought by former participants in a profit sharing retirement plan who
sought to have the plan declared illegal and void. See Wells, 250 F.2d at 224-26. The parties
stipulated in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon that New York law
applied. Id. at 225-26. The Ninth Circuit did not disturb the stipulation. Id. at 226.
The Tenth Circuit similarly accepted a choice of law stipulation proffered by the parties
after the initiation of litigation in Hulme v. Sweetman Construction Co. See Hulme, 230 F.2d
at 68 n.4. In Hulme, a supplier of crushed rock brought suit to recover the unpaid balance on
a contract with the defendant. Id. at 68. The defendant counterclaimed seeking damages
allegedly resulting from the supplier's failure to furnish rock pursuant to the defendant's
requests. Id. The litigants stipulated in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas that the law of South Dakota controlled each claim. Id. at 68 n.4. The district court
and the Tenth Circuit applied South Dakota law as stipulated by the parties. Id.
84. See, e.g., Eckhart v. Plastic Film Corp., 129 F. Supp. 277, 279 (D. Conn. 1955)
(counsel for both parties agreed in oral argument that New York law governed issues of
construction and validity of contract); Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. White, 406
S.W.2d 145, 147-48 (Ky. 1966) (stipulated in trial court that New York law governed rights of
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reasons exist for allowing litigants' choice of law agreements.85 Permitting
litigants to choose the applicable law does not enable the parties to avoid
disputes under the contract since a dispute already has arisen under the
contract. 86 Ground rules for transactions adopted after the transactions have
failed are not effective in guiding the parties' performance of contractual
duties . 7 If a tacit understanding between the parties concerning the applicable
law is evident, however, a court's decision to allow the litigants to stipulate
the applicable law will protect the expectancies of the parties.8 8 Since Amer-
ican courts give considerable weight to the reasonable, objective intentions
of the parties to a contract, 9 no countervailing policy exists for refusing to
give effect to an otherwise valid choice of law stipulation when evidenced by
a tacit agreement.9
In addition to the potential for protecting the expectancies of the parties,
choice of law stipulations arising during the course of litigation may remedy
inequalities in existing contracts.93 A party to a contract in an originally
parties under insurance contract); Productora E Importada De Papel, S.A. De C.V. v. Fleming,
376 Mass. 826,-, 383 N.E.2d 1129, 1135 n.9 (1978) (court accepted litigants' tacit stipulation
that Massachusetts law applied despite choice of law clause in contract that made Mexican law
applicable).
85. See infra notes 86-100 and accompanying text (examining litigants' choice of law
stipulations in light of policies supporting choice of law clauses in contracts).
86. But cf. supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text (discussing role of choice of law
stipulations in providing stable ground rules for business relationships).
87. Id.
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment a, at 561 (1971)
(when contract does not refer to state whose laws shall govern contract, forum nevertheless
may apply parties' intended choice of law when evidenced by tacit understanding); see also
supra note 14 (choice of law stipulations protect expectations of parties to contract).
89. See Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1955) (parties
intended choice of law controls as long as laws of state that parties choose are reasonably
related to transaction); Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
(same); William Whitman Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 125 F. Supp. 137, 147 (D. Del.
1954) (same). See generally 4 W. JAEGER, WILUSTON ON CONTRACTS § 610B, at 533-34 (3d ed.
1961) (contract not only includes express terms but also includes reasonable objective intentions
of parties included through implication).
90. See supra note 89 (discussing American courts' recognition of intent of parties as
guiding contract interpretation).
91. See G. DELAUmE, supra note 2, § 2.04, at 24-25. Delaume argued that litigants' choice
of law stipulations may remedy inequalities in support of the adoption of Article 3(2) of the
1980 European Convention of the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, which allows
parties to agree on the law to govern a contract at any time. Id. While Delaume made the
argument in reference to international contracts, arguably no need exists for distinguishing rules
and techniques of choice of law applicable to international conflicts cases from cases involving
interstate conflicts. See Prebble, Choice of Law to Determine the Validity and Effect of
Contracts: A Comparison of English and American Approaches to the Conflict of Laws, 58
CORNELL L. REV. 433, 486 (1973) (no difference exists in rules or techniques in resolving
interstate versus international conflicts problems, although results may be different due to
factors peculiar to international contracts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 10
(1971) (rules in Restatement apply to international as well as interstate conflicts of laws). But
cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 10 comment d (1971) (courts may apply
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weaker position may perceive conflicts problems and, through stipulation,
may be able to take advantage of this newly acquired perception. 92 Arguably,
to deny the weaker party the opportunity to strengthen his position is unfair. 9
While courts should not permit litigants to affect the interests of third
parties, no compelling reason exists for denying litigants the right to stipulate
a choice of law that the parties could have stipulated in their contract.
94
Moreover, courts can save time by giving effect to litigants' choice of
law stipulations. 95 When a contract that lacks a choice of law provision
becomes the subject of litigation in this country, courts may need to apply
a wide variety of rules to determine the applicable body of substantive law.
96
An agreement between the parties concerning the laws controlling the contract
not only saves the trial court time in making a determination of the applicable
law through analysis of the forum's choice of law rules, but also averts any
possibility of remand due to choice of law error.
97
One commentator has suggested that American courts, consistent with
courts around the world, will extend the autonomy afforded parties to a
contract in deciding the governing law to the postdispute stage. 9 In light of
the policies supporting litigants' choice of law stipulations, and absent
overriding public policy concerns of the forum or any other state, American
general principles of Restatement to reach just and predictable decisions in novel situations
resulting from some significant differences between interstate and international cases).
92. See G. DELAUME, supra note 2, § 2.04, at 24 (discussing advantages of litigants' choice
of law stipulations).
93. Id.
94. Id.; see Freeman v. Kohl & Vick Mach. Works, Inc., 673 F.2d 196, 198 n.2 (7th Cir.
1982) (third party defendant not bound by choice of law stipulation of original litigants due to
strong federal policies against collusion and forum shopping).
95. See El Hoss Eng'g & Transp. Co. v. American Indep. Oil Co., 183 F. Supp. 394, 399
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (litigants' choice of law stipulations further judicial economy by reducing
litigation and relieving court of having to resolve ambiguities), rev'd on other grounds, 289
F.2d 346, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961); see also supra note 12 (choice of law stipulations
allow courts to forego choice of law analysis under varying formulas and permit courts to save
time in resolving ambiguities in intent of parties).
96. See Jansson v. Swedish Am. Line, 185 F.2d 212, 219 (1st Cir. 1950) (because of
infinite variety of fact situations presented in contract cases, no simple rule exists for choosing
applicable law); William Whitman Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 125 F. Supp. 137, 146 (D.
Del. 1954) (American conflict of law rules differ concerning law applicable when conflict exists
between place of execution and place of performance of contract); Cooper v. Cherokee Village
Dev. Co., 236 Ark. 37,-, 364 S.W.2d 158, 161-62 (1963) (in determining law governing
issue of validity of interstate contracts, American courts commonly utilize four different choice
of law rules, three of which have been used in Arkansas).
97. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Volvo of Am. Corp., 752 F.2d 1221, 1227 (7th Cir. 1984)
(remanding case to district court because district court failed to clarify choice of law conclusions);
Barnes Group, Inc. v. C & C Prods., Inc., 716 F.2d 1023, 1032-33 (4th Cir. 1983) (remanding
case because district court incorrectly applied law of place of contracting on issue of covenant
not to compete); Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1546 (lth Cir.
1983) (remanding case based on Eleventh Circuit's disagreement with district court's choice of
law under government interest analysis).
98. See EHRENZWEIG, supra note 1, at 469-70 (discussing domestic and foreign acceptance
of litigants' choice of law stipulations).
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courts should give effect to litigants' choice of law stipulations in contract
disputes. 99 Courts should not discard this alternative approach to the tradi-
tional choice of law analysis, which saves time and money for both courts
and litigants, without closer examination.100
Aside from contract disputes, American courts also have considered
litigants' choice of law stipulations in tort actions.' 0' For example, in Lloyd
v. Loeffler,10 2 which the Seventh Circuit cited for support in Twohy,'0 the
father of a child brought an action against the child's mother, the mother's
husband and the maternal grandparents, alleging that the defendants con-
spired to interfere with the custody of the father's child by concealing his
daughter's location.'0 4 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin, applying Wisconsin substantive law, entered judgment
for the plaintiff.05
The maternal grandparents appealed to the Seventh Circuit, challenging
the district court's finding that complete diversity existed and that an
intentional interference with the custody of a child claim was a valid cause
of action under Wisconsin law.' 6 The Seventh Circuit noted that a threshold
choice of law issue existed concerning the plaintiff's intentional interference
claim. 0 7 The district court applied Wisconsin substantive law, concluding
that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
99. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text (discussing policies supporting acceptance
of litigants' choice of law stipulations).
100. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (outlining benefits that accrue when
courts honor parties' choice of law); supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text (discussing
benefits gained when courts honor litigants' choice of law stipulations).
101. See, e.g., Freeman v. Kohl & Vick Mach. Works, Inc., 673 F.2d 196, 198 n.2 (7th
Cir. 1982) (honoring litigant's choice of law stipulation in products liability claim); Davis v.
Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 127 (9th Cir. 1968) (litigants' stipulation of Montana
law honored, although Montana law devoid of precedent on issue of manufacturer's duty of
potential dangers in use of drugs); Casella v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 381 F.2d 473, 475 (4th Cir.
1967) (litigants' stipulation of New York law honored in negligence action, although New York
case laws contained leading case against plaintiffs' claim); see also infra notes 102-38 and
accompanying text (discussing recent federal circuit decisions concerning tort litigants' choice
of law stipulations).
102. 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982).
103. 758 F.2d at 1190.
104. Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998, 999 (E.D. Wisc.), aff'd, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.
1982).
105. Id. at 1003, 1005-06. The district court in Lloyd found that Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
required application of Wisconsin substantive law. Id. at 1003; see Erie R.R., 304 U.S. 64
(1938). The United States Supreme Court in Erie Railroad ruled that federal courts exercising
diversity or pendent jurisdiction must apply the law of the forum state. 304 U.S. at 78.
106. 694 F.2d at 490. In Lloyd, the appellants' claim that the parties lacked complete
diversity arose out of the uncertainty of the domicile of both the mother and her husband. Id.
The Seventh Circuit considered the mother and her husband fugitives, and the Lloyd court
found that a fugitive's domicile is the last domicile a fugitive had before beginning his flight
from justice. Id. The Lloyd court, therefore, ruled that the mother and her husband were
domiciled in Maryland, and that complete diversity existed. Id.
107. Id. at 495.
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demanded application of the forum's substantive law. 08 The Seventh Circuit
observed that the district court should have determined whether Wisconsin
choice of law rules required application of Wisconsin substantive law or the
law of another state.' 9 The Lloyd court noted that Wisconsin choice of law
rules may have required application of the substantive law of Maryland,
where a state court had issued a custody decree, or the law of Virginia,
where the father was domiciled and where the defendants may have formed
the tortious intent."
0
In a supplementary brief, the appellants in Lloyd contended that Mary-
land rather than Wisconsin substantive law applied under Wisconsin choice
of law rules."' The appellants had not asserted that Maryland law applied
either in their main brief or while the action was pending in the district
court." 2 At oral argument before the Seventh Circuit, counsel for both
parties confirmed that the parties had stipulated in the district court that
Wisconsin law applied to all issues in the action."3 The Seventh Circuit was
unwilling to release the appellants from the stipulation of Wisconsin law
during this latter stage in the proceedings.'
4
Recognizing that courts often honor choice of law stipulations in contract
cases, the Seventh Circuit in Lloyd held that litigants' choice of law stipu-
lations in tort cases deserve equal respect.' Although the Seventh Circuit
noted that courts have a significant interest in applying a body of law that
is in force somewhere, the Lloyd court concluded that courts have less
interest in the particular body of law applied." 6 The Lloyd court stated, for
example, that if the parties stipulated that the Code of Hammurabi' ' 7 applied,
a court would not render a decision on that basis because the ruling would
have no precedential value."' The Seventh Circuit explained that the pro-
duction of precedent is a major function of judicial decision making and
108. 694 F.2d at 495. In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., the Supreme Court found
that Erie Railroad v. Tompkins requires federal courts exercising diversity or pendent jurisdiction
to consider the forum state's choice of law rules to determine the applicable law, not simply
application of the forum's substantive law. 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941). Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938).




113. Id. While the record in Lloyd was void of a written choice of law stipulation, the
Seventh Circuit found no difference between the effectiveness of an oral and a written choice of
law stipulation by litigants. Id.
114. Id.; cf. supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing Twohy court's unwillingness
to allow parties to renounce stipulation in latter stages of proceedings).
115. 694 F.2d at 495.
116. Id.
117. Id. The Code of Hammurabi was a set of laws prepared by a Babylonian King and
was among the earliest bodies of law in human history. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 644 (5th ed.
1979).
118. 694 F.2d at 495; cf. infra note 173 and accompanying text (courts will not honor
litigants' choice of law stipulations if law chosen is not in force somewhere).
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that courts may disregard stipulations by litigants concerning the content of
the law for failure to promote this judicial function." 9 Because the Lloyd
court concluded that tort litigants' choice of law stipulations are consistent
with the judicial function of precedent production, the Seventh Circuit found
no inconsistency in recognizing choice of law stipulations by tort litigants
while rejecting stipulations concerning the content or meaning of the law. 120
Upon concluding that courts should honor choice of law stipulations by
tort litigants, the Seventh Circuit proceeded to assess the reasonableness of
the stipulation proffered in Lloyd. 12' The Lloyd court found that implicit in
Wisconsin choice of law principles is the requirement that in the absence of
objection, Wisconsin substantive law applies to a suit tried in a Wisconsin
court. 122 If the parties in Lloyd had not stipulated Wisconsin law, but instead
had litigated the case under the laws of Wisconsin without objecting to its
application, a federal court sitting in Wisconsin would not question the
application of Wisconsin law. 23 The Seventh Circuit, therefore, found that
the stipulation of Wisconsin law in Lloyd was reasonable. 24
Although the Lloyd court stated that, to its knowledge the issue of
litigants' choice of law stipulations had not arisen previously in a tort case, 
12
other courts had considered tort litigants' choice of law stipulations prior to
the Seventih Circuit's decision in Lloyd. 26 For example, the Third Circuit in
System Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Development Corp.,127 consid-
ering allegations of product disparagement, refused to extend the rule
allowing parties to agree contractually on the law governing a dispute to
allow tort litigants to stipulate the applicable law. 28 In System Operations,
a New Jersey corporation brought a common-law cause of action for
declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey against Scientific Games Development Corp., a Michigan cor-
poration with its principal place of business in Georgia. 29 The plaintiff
119. Id.; see supra note 42 (stipulations on the content or meaning of law are without
force).
120. Id.; contra Ezell v. Hayes Oilfield Constr. Co., Inc., 693 F.2d 489, 492 n.2 (5th Cir.
1982) (litigants' choice of law stipulations are no more binding than stipulations concerning
content or meaning of law), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 79 (1983); see supra notes 49-59 and
accompanying text (discussion of Ezell).
121. 694 F.2d at 495.
122. Id. The Lloyd court cited the Seventh Circuit's decision in Central Soya Co. v. Epstein
Fisheries, Inc. in support of the conclusion that in the absence of objection, Wisconsin law
applies to an action tried in a Wisconsin court. Id.; Central Soya Co., 676 F.2d 939, 941 (7th
Cir. 1982).
123. 694 F.2d at 495.
124. Id.
.125. Id.
126. See infra notes 127-38 and accompanying text (discussing decisions prior to Lloyd
involving tort litigants' choice of law stipulations).
127. 555 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1977).
128. Id. at 1137 n.4.
129. 414 F. Supp. 750, 751 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 555 F.2d 1131 (3d. Cir. 1977).
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claimed that the defendant had engaged in a campaign to falsely disparage
the security of the plaintiff's lottery ticket business in Delaware, Illinois,
Michigan, Nebraska, and New Jersey.'30 The district court, finding little
difference in product disparagement laws among these states, issued a
preliminary injunction against the defendant corporation based on authority
from a variety of jurisdictions. 3 '
Scientific Games Development Corp. appealed the district court's deci-
sion to the Third Circuit. 3 2 The Third Circuit found that in utilizing authority
from several states, the district court had ignored the rule of Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,'3 requiring federal courts in diversity
and pendent jurisdiction cases to examine the forum state's choice of law
rules to determine the applicable body of law. a4 Following the rule of
Klaxon, the Third Circuit determined that a New Jersey court would have
invoked government interest analysis to identify the appropriate law to govern
the issues involved.1 31 Recognizing that government interest analysis pointed
to no less than six possible bodies of law, the parties offered to stipulate to
the application of general, common-law principles of product disparagement
law. 3 6 The Third Circuit noted that the court must determine the effectiveness
of this stipulation through application of the forum's choice of law princi-
ples. 37 Finding no decision in New Jersey nor in any other state upholding
a choice of law stipulation in a tort case, the Third Circuit ruled that it
could not assume that New Jersey courts would honor tort litigants' choice
of law stipulations. 3 8
As in the contract cases, most courts that have considered litigants'
choice of law stipulations in tort cases have failed to support their decision,
but instead have commented on the lack of decisions on point.3 9 The absence
130. Id.
131. See id. at 757-64 (citing variety of authority as support for ordering preliminary
injunction).
132. 555 F.2d at 1136.
133. 313 U.S. 487 (1941); see supra note 108 (discussing Klaxon).
134. 555 F.2d at 1136; see Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496-97 (forum state's choice of law rules
govern in diversity and pendent jurisdiction cases).
135. Id. at 1137. The Third Circuit in System Operations determined that New Jersey
courts would resolve the choice of law problem in a product disparagement case by identifying
and weighing the interest of each related state in having its product disparagement laws govern
the case. Id. The Third Circuit labeled the process of determining the applicable law through
the weighing of states' interests as government interest analysis. Id.
136. Id. at 1137 n.4. Since the plaintiff in System Operations alleged that the plaintiff's
product was disparaged in five different states, each of the five states arguably had a substantial
interest in having its law applied. Id. at 1137. Arguably, Georgia, the defendant's principal
place of business, also had a substantial interest in having the product disparagement laws of
Georgia apply. Id.
137. Id.; see supra note 108 (federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply
forum's choice of law rules).
138. 555 F.2d at 1134 n.4.
139. See Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding tort litigants'
choice of law stipulation despite absence of cases on point); System Operations, Inc. v. Scientific
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of detailed reasoning concerning why courts should or should not honor tort
litigants' choice of law stipulations necessitates an examination of tort
stipulations in light of the policies underlying the acceptance of contractual
choice of law clauses.'
4
A contractual relationship gains stability when the parties to the contract
agree on the law to govern the course of their dealings and when the parties
know that courts will honor their choice of law.' 41 Some contracts contain
choice of law stipulations directed at potential tort actions between the
parties, and courts may honor the parties' choice to ensure contractual
stability. 42 In noncontractual relationship settings, tort litigants likely cannot
claim successfully that a tacit agreement existed between the parties concern-
ing the law to govern the allegedly tortious act prior to performance of the
act, because evidence of a tacit agreement concerning the implications of
an act may lead to a finding of consent to the tortious act.' 43 Allowing the
tort litigants to stipulate the substantive law to govern the action, therefore,
does not always protect expectancies of the parties.1'4
A second major consideration in judicial acceptance of contractual choice
of law stipulations is the time and effort saved by courts in avoiding
traditional choice of law analysis. 45 Judicial economy also is the primary
reason courts might consider adopting the litigants' choice of law stipulations
in tort cases.'" The need to hold the cost of litigation within bounds and to
keep court dockets moving is a valid concern for the courts. 47 Stipulations
Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1134 n.4 (3d Cir. 1977) (rejecting tort litigants' stipulation
of applicable'law because of absence of authority).
140. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (discussing policies underlying acceptance
of choice of law clauses in contracts); infra notes 141-55 and accompanying text (examining
tort litigants' choice of law stipulations in light of policies supporting acceptance of choice of
law clauses in contracts).
141. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (parties gain certainty in business
transactions when courts honor choice of law clauses).
142. See, e.g., Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 194-95 (2d. Cir. 1955)
(personal injury claim against shipping line dismissed in accord with law of England stipulated
in contract of carriage); Piscane v. Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione, 219 F.Supp. 424,
425 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (provision in passage ticket stipulating that law of Italy would govern
claims for injuries to passengers was not conclusive, but court did consider stipulation in
choosing appropriate law); Caruso v. Italian Line, 184 F. Supp. 862, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(same).
143. See M. SPEISER, C. KAUSE & A. GANS, supra note 5, § 5:7 at 797-98 (one does not
sustain legal injury from act to which one consents).
144. But cf. supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (discussing protection of party
expectancies gained through certainty in choice of law).
145. See supra note 12 (choice of law stipulations reduce litigation).
146. See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text (reduction in litigation is legitimate
interest of courts and courts reduce litigation through application of litigants' choice of law
stipulations).
147. See Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1955) (choice
of law stipulations save courts time and effort in resolving ambiguities); see also United States
v. Montgomery, 620 F.2d 753, 757 (10th Cir.) (parties enter into stipulations to dispense with
proof over matters not in issue and, therefore, promote judicial economy), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 882 (1980).
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by tort litigants often further these interests. 4 Honoring litigant's choice of
law stipulations based on a concern for judicial economy alone, however,
may prompt forceful objections from observers that courts are permitting
the parties to exercise powers traditionally reserved to the legislature. 49
Although courts have quieted the concern of usurpation of a legislative
function in the realm of contracts, courts may not quell the objection as
easily in tort cases.150 Tort actions often involve strong public policy concerns
to raise standards of conduct to levels deemed acceptable by the legislature. 15'
Arguably, society should not permit a tort litigant to choose the standards
of conduct applicable to his own actions. 5 2 Courts should consider, however,
authorized and deliberate stipulations by parties who have dealt with each
148. See Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363, 1367 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (concerns for judicial
economy require that courts dispose of litigation on parties' stipulation, if possible); supra note
12 (choice of law stipulations reduce litigation and are less burdensome on courts than tradition
choice of law analysis).
149. See J.H. BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 232.2, at 1079-80 (1935) (asserting that
courts convert any two parties into legislative body when courts honor choice of law stipulations
because determination of which of several systems of law apply is act of law). Judge Learned
Hand once argued that courts should not honor choice of law stipulations because courts should
not permit parties to avoid application of a set of laws on the parties' own initiative. See E.
Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1931) (dictum) (considering choice
of law provision in bill of lading that asserted application of law of state other than state in
which contract executed). American courts have upheld choice of law stipulations in contracts
despite the argument that choice of law stipulations allow parties to legislate. See Duskin v.
Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp., 167 F.2d 727, 730 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 829
(1948). Commentators often cite the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Duskin for its rationale in
rejecting the protests of private legislation. See A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 1, at 468 (using
Duskin reasoning to explain why concerns of usurpation of legislative function are not
convincing). The Duskin court reasoned that as long as the parties' stipulation does not offend
public policy, courts have no more reason for precluding parties to a contract from stipulating
that the law of any jurisdiction governs the rights and obligations under a contract than for
precluding the parties from expressly stipulating rules of interpretation for terms in the contract.
167 F.2d at 730. This rationale, however, does not refute the allegations of legislation in the
tort situation. In a tort case, courts measure the actions of the parties against a standard of
conduct that a legislature has deemed acceptable under the law. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 4 (5th ed. 1984) (torts consist of breaches of duties created by law
without concern for agreement of parties to assume duties or evade them). Alternatively, in
contract cases, courts examine the actions of the parties in light of rights and obligations agreed
upon by the parties. 4 W. JAEGER, supra note 89, § 601A, at 286 (discussing interpretation and
construction of contracts in light of parties' will as determined by applicable law).
150. See supra note 149 (discussing concerns of tort litigants' usurpation of legislative
function in choice of law stipulations).
151. See Daily v. Sombert, 28 N.J. 372, 380, 146 A.2d 676, 681 (1958) (when injurious
consequences take place in New Jersey, New Jersey has substantial interest in applying New
Jersey law to medical malpractice actions to deter further tortious conduct); Cheatham & Reese,
Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 959, 972-76 (1952) (tort cases often involve
strong public policy concerns which may induce forum to apply law of another state to case).
152. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 149, § I at 4 (parties to tort dispute have
no role in determining standards by which courts will measure parties conduct); see Reeg v.
Shaughnessy, 570 F.2d 309, 314 (10th Cir. 1978) (parties to medical malpractice action could
not stipulate medical standards to apply).
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other fairly and at arms length. 53 The position of the Seventh Circuit, as
the decision in Lloyd v. Loeffler demonstrates, is that courts should honor
reasonable choice of law stipulations by tort litigants for the same reasons
courts honor choice of law clauses in contract disputes. 154 Although not all
of the policies supporting contractual choice of law stipulations translate
into the tort situation, the concern for judicial economy should foster judicial
acceptance of reasonable choice of law stipulations by tort litigants.'
Some courts that have accepted litigants' choice of law stipulations in
both tort and contract disputes have commented on the reasonableness of
the stipulation. 56 In judging a stipulation's reasonableness, the courts hon-
oring litigants' agreements have considered such factors as the applicable
law absent the stipulation,"" the situs of the transactions or occurrence,"
the location of the contract negotiations 59 and parties' domicile, or place of
incorporation or principal place of business.' 6° The courts that have rejected
proffered stipulations consistently never have reached the question of the
stipulations' reasonableness.'
6'
Despite the scarcity of discussion detailing courts' reasons for accepting
or rejecting litigants' choice of law stipulations, some general principles can
be derived from those cases that have addressed the issue of litigants' choice
of law stipulations. 62 For example, if the plaintiff in an action argues the
law of a certain jurisdiction in the complaint and the defendant responds in
terms of the same set of laws, a court may deem the litigants to have
153. See supra notes 12 and 17 and accompanying text (discussing choice of law stipulations
role in promoting judicial economy).
154. 694 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir. 1982); supra notes 102-24 and accompanying text
(discussion of Lloyd).
155. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text (tort litigants' choice of law stipulations
promote judicial economy).
156. See Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 445 F. Supp. 537, 544
(D. Mass. 1977) (stipulation was reasonable because court would have applied Massachusetts
law under appropriate relation test had no stipulation existed).
157. See id. (finding stipulation reasonable since same law would apply absent stipulation).
158. See Twohy v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 758 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1985)
(litigants' choice of Spanish law was reasonable because alleged contract performable in Spain).
159. See Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602, 607 (3d Cir. 1958) (court did
not question choice of law stipulation since chosen law was that of state where parties negotiated
contract).
160. See Business Incentives Co. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 397 F. Supp. 63, 67 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (despite stipulation in contract that New York law applied, New Jersey law applied
because New Jersey had strong public policy of protecting small business incorporated in New
Jersey).
161. See, e.g., Ezell v. Hayes Oilfield Constr. Co., Inc., 693 F.2d 489, 492 n.2 (5th Cir.
1982) (litigants' choice of law stipulation rejected without discussing reasonableness of stipula-
tion), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 79 (1983); System Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev.
Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1137 n.2 (3d Cir. 1977) (same); Consolidated Water Power & Paper Co.
v. Spartan Aircraft Co., 185 F.2d 947, 949 (3d Cir. 1950) (same).
162. See infra notes 163-75 and accompanying text (drawing general conclusions from
decisions concerning litigants' choice of law stipulations).
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stipulated the applicable law. 163 Further, by not objecting to a judge's
application of a set of laws, the parties may find themselves bound to that
law as if the parties themselves had so stipulated.164 Concerns for judicial
economy and fairness to the opposing party demand that a party object at
the outset if the law applied is unacceptable. 65 Once the parties have
stipulated the choice of law, the court should not permit a retraction of the
stipulation by one litigant when the other litigant has developed his case
based on the stipulated law or when the court has proceeded under the
assumption that the parties were in agreement on the applicable law.'
66
Upon application of the forum's choice of law rules, a court may find
that several bodies of law might apply.' 67 A court likely will honor an
agreement between the parties stipulating that one of the possible bodies of
163. See Scott Paper Co. v. Adair Truck & Equip. Co., 542 F.2d 1257, 1259 n.3 (5th Cir.
1976) (arguably, while either Louisiana law or Alabama law applied to contract case, parties
deemed to have stipulated application of Alabama law when in briefs and at oral argument
parties argued Alabama law); Gaull v. Abbot Laboratories, Inc., No. 84C 8895 (N.D. Ill. May
10, 1985) (available Oct. 1, 1985, on WESTLAW, Dct database) (argument of summary
judgment motion entirely under New York law resulted in application of New York law to
defamation case as if parties had so stipulated); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Skov, 51 F.
Supp. 470, 473 (D. Or. 1943) (court deemed parties to contract dispute to have stipulated
application of Washington law when parties argued under Washington law and conversed with
court in terms of Washington law); see also State ex rel. Kansas City Stockyards Co. of Me. v.
Clark, 536 S.W.2d 142, 146 (Mo. 1976) (court gave significant weight to fact that plaintiff's
complaint and defendant's answer alleged that Missouri law was applicable in giving effect to
pretrial choice of law stipulation in wrongful death case).
164. See Casio, Inc. v. S.M. & R. Co., Inc., 755 F.2d 528, 531 (7th Cir. 1985). In Casio,
the Seventh Circuit found that the district court incorrectly had applied the forum's rules of
decision. Id. at 531. Since the parties in Casio never objected to the district court's application
of Illinois law to the contract dispute, however, the Seventh Circuit deemed the parties to have
stipulated the application of Illinois substantive law. Id.; see also International Adm'rs Inc. v.
Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 753 F.2d 1373, 1376-77 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying Illinois law since
parties made no objection to district court's decision to apply Illinois law on issues of tortious
interference with contractual relations, although Illinois law likely would not govern under
choice of law analysis).
165. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (unwillingness of Twohy court to free
plaintiff of pretrial choice of law stipulation); supra note 164 (citing courts that have refused
to apply law of another state since parties did not object to application of law chosen by lower
court).
166. See Tannerfors v. American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 397 F. Supp. 141, 144-145 n.4
(D.N.J. 1975) (refusing to apply Florida law at request of one party when that party had
stipulated application of New Jersey law and had not raised objection to application of New
Jersey law to good faith issues of case until after trial), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1976);
Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 445 F. Supp. 537, 544 (D. Mass.
1977) (court would not relieve plaintiff of stipulation that Massachusetts law applied to breach
of contract issues when defendant had prepared case under Massachusetts law based on parties'
stipulation).
167. See System Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1137 (3d
Cir. 1977) (under government interest analysis, law of six different states could apply to product
disparagement claim).
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law should govern the issues of the case.16s Again, courts may accept the
litigants' choice of law stipulation because of concerns for judicial econ-
omy. 69 An agreement between the parties will allow the court to avoid
making a complex choice of law decision and also will avert the possibility
of remand due to choice of law error. 70
While European courts have tended to honor the litigant's choice of law
only when the parties have stipulated the law as that of the forum, 7'
American courts have not so confined the litigants. 72 American courts,
however, will not honor a stipulation that calls for a resolution of the dispute
using general, legal principles or by using laws which currently are not in
force somewhere. '73 A stipulation" that calls for resolution of the dispute
under nonstatutory rules does not promote the judicial function of precedent
production7 " and may destroy the court's subject matter jurisdiction .
7
Aside from questions of validity in litigants' choice of law stipulations,
questions of interpretation may arise when a court encounters a choice of
law stipulation by litigants. 76 If courts are willing to accept stipulations by
litigants in either tort or contract cases, courts must decide whether to look
to the whole law of the chosen state, including the state's choice of law
rules, or only to the substantive law of the state chosen. 77 When the parties
168. See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Stan Cross Buick, Inc., 343 Mass. 622, 625, 180
N.E.2d 88, 90-91 (1962) (Massachusetts conflicts principles would apply Maine law to action
for conversion, but since parties had not demonstrated that differences existed in law of two
states, Massachusetts courts should assume laws are identical).
169. See supra notes 12 and 17 and accompanying text (stipulations concerning governing
law save court time and effort in resolving conflicts problems).
170. Id.
171. See G. DELAUME, supra note 10, at 21-22 (concluding that common feature of foreign
court decisions honoring choice of law stipulations is that stipulation is to law of forum); but
see infra note 172 and accompanying text (finding that American courts have not restricted
litigants' choice of law stipulations to that of law of forum).
172. See, e.g., Twoby v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 758 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1985)
(applying law of Spain in Illinois forum); Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n. v. White,
406 S.W.2d 145, 147-48 (Ky. 1966) (law of New York applied in Kentucky forum); cf. Gonzalez
v. Volvo of Am. Corp., 752 F.2d 295, 299 (7th Cir. 1985) (preferable to apply substantive law
of forum rather than allow choice of law stipulation when parties fail to show clearly that
conflict of laws exists).
173. See Central Soya Co., Inc. v. Epstein Fisheries, Inc., 676 F.2d 939, 941 (7th Cir.
1982) (under Erie doctrine, federal court cannot allow parties to stipulate that general common
law principles apply); supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (stipulated law must be
operative in some state or country).
174. See supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text (discussing judicial function of
precedent production).
175. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (if stipulated law is not operative in
some jurisdiction, stipulation is ineffective).
176. See infra notes 178-95 and accompanying text (concluding that courts should construe
litigants' choice of law stipulations as referencing only substantive law of chosen state, unless
expressly provided otherwise).
177. See infra notes 183-95 and accompanying text (discussing policies against viewing
choice of law stipulations as referencing chosen state's choice of law rules).
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include a choice of law clause in a contract, the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws 78 instructs that, unless there is a clear indication to the
contrary, the forum should apply only the substantive law of the stipulated
state. 79 American courts have accepted the view of the Restatement and
rarely look beyond the substantive law of the stipulated state.'8 0 Courts
enforcing litigants' stipulations similarly have looked only to the chosen
state's substantive law.'8 '
In choice of law stipulations by litigants in either tort or contract
disputes, the forum should not look beyond the substantive law of the
stipulated state for several reasons.'8 2 First, American courts have refused to
play the interstate or international "ping-pong"'' 3 which may result if a
choice of law stipulation is deemed to reference the chosen state's choice of
law rules.8 4 If the forum looks to the stipulated state's choice of law rules,
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(e) (1971).
179. Id. When parties to a contract stipulate the applicable law, one logically may conclude
that the parties are referring to the chosen state's local law only. Id., comment h, at 569.
Applying the whole law, which includes the choice of law rules of the chosen state, destroys
the predictability and certainty which the parties intended the stipulation to attain. Id. If courts
were to apply the whole law of a chosen state, the parties no longer would be able to ascertain
the governing law since the stipulated state's choice of law rules may require application of a
third state's laws. Id.
180. See Born v. Norwegian Am. Line, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 33, 34-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)
(stipulation of Norwegian law construed to refer only to local law of Norway), McGill v. Hill,
31 Wash. App. 542, 547, 644 P.2d 680, 683 (1982) (stipulation that Pennsylvania law would
govern resulted in application of Pennsylvania substantive law without consideration of Penn-
sylvania choice of law rules).
181. See, e.g., Casella v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 381 F.2d 473, 475 (4th Cir. 1967)
(applying New York substantive law in case on appeal from United States District Court for
Western District of Virginia based upon litigants' stipulation); Johnson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577
F. Supp. 174, 175 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (upon stipulation by parties that New York law applied,
Pennsylvania choice of law rules demand application of New York substantive law), aff'd, 738
F.2d 422 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 184 (1984). Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Skov, 51
F. Supp. 470, 473 (D. Or. 1943) (district court construed stipulation of Washington law to
require application of Washington substantive law only).
182. See infra notes 183-95 and accompanying text (discussing policies against viewing
choice of law stipulations as referencing whole law of chosen state).
183. See Falconbridge, Renvol. Characterization and Acquired Rights, 17 CAN. BAR REV.
369, 379 (1939) (asserting that game of "ping-pong" often results from court's examination of
another country's choice of law rules).
184. See Polglase v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 335, 337 (D. Md. 1975). Once
a Maryland court concludes that the law of another state applies, Maryland courts will look
only to the substantive law of the chosen state. Id. If a Maryland court construed the choice
of law to reference the conflicts rules of the chosen state, those rules might cause the court to
reconsider Maryland law. Id. The chain of events described above would result in a renvoi
which is contrary to the view espoused by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Id.;
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(3) (1971); infra notes 185-88 and
accompanying text (discussing policies underlying rejection of renvoi doctrine in United States);
see also McAvoy v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 187 F. Supp. 46, 50 (W.D. Ark. 1960)
(in determining applicable body of law, Arkansas courts would look only to law relevant to
precise question and not to chosen state's choice of law rules); Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co.,
55 N.J. 511, 526, 263 A.2d 129, 136-37 (1970) (once applicable law determined through
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and if those rules differ from the choice of law rules of the forum, the
forum may find that the forum state's law is applicable." 5 If the court,
however, may apply logically the chosen state's choice of law rules, appli-
cation of the forum state's choice of law rules is just as logical.'8 6 Since the
litigants have stipulated that the laws of the second state are applicable, the
search for the appropriate substantive law could continue ad infinitum.
817
Courts avoid this endless circle, commonly known as renvoi, when courts
only look to the substantive law of the stipulated state. 8
A second reason why courts should look only to the substantive law of
the chosen state is that the recognition of a choice of law stipulation
demonstrates the forum's acceptance of at least some party autonomy.'89 To
construe the litigants' stipulation as a submission to the law determined
government interest analysis, New Jersey courts will not look to choice of law rules of chosen
state since court would not serve government interest analysis goals of simplicity and uniformity).
See generally Falconbridge, supra note 183, at 379 (asserting that reference to choice of law
rules of chosen state may lead countries into endless game of "ping-pong"); Cormack, Renvoi,
Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in the Conflict of Laws, 14 So. CALIF.
L. REV. 221, 250 (1941) (discussing insoluble logical dilemma of renvoi which may arise when
courts view applicable law as including choice of law rules of state whose law court applies).
185. See Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis.2d 130,-, 95 N.W.2d 814,
820 (1959). In Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co. the Wisconsin Supreme court rejected
the renvoi doctrine, maintaining that the doctrine leads courts on a never ending circle. Id. at
-, 95 N.W.2d at 820. In Haumschild, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the issue of
whether a wife could sue her husband for damages as the result of injuries she suffered in an
automobile accident in California. Id. at , 95 N.W.2d at 820. The Haumschild court
explained that because the husband and wife were domiciled in Wisconsin a conflict of laws
existed. Id. at -, 95 N.W.2d at 820. If the court followed the then existing conflicts rule in
Wisconsin concerning interspousal capacity to sue, a Wisconsin court would examine the law
of the state where the wrong occurred. Id. at __ , 95 N.W.2d at 820. Accordingly, a Wisconsin
court would look to the law of California to see whether a wife could sue her husband in tort.
Id. at , 95 N.W.2d at 820. While California substantive law provided that a wife could
not sue her husband in tort, California had adopted a conflicts of law principle which states
that the law of the domicile is -determinative. Id. at -, 95 N.W.2d at 820. The California
conflicts of law principle would refer the court back to Wisconsin law since the parties were
domiciled in Wisconsin. Id. at , 95 N.W.2d at 820. Since the conflicts rule in Wisconsin
required application of the law where the wrong occurred without reference to the law of the
state where the parties were domiciled, an endless circle would occur. Id. at , 95 N.W.2d
at 820. Recognizing that this result would produce chaos in the field of conflict of laws, the
Haumschild court ruled that whenever a conflict of laws arises in a case involving interspousal
capacity to sue in tort, Wisconsin courts will apply the law of the parties' domicile. Id. at -,
95 N.W.2d at 820.
186. See Cormack, supra note 184, at 250 (discussing how renvoi is encountered); see also
supra note 185 (discussion of renvoi in Haumschild).
187. See Cormack, supra note 184, at 250 (endless circle may occur when courts view
applicable law as including chosen state's choice of law rules); Haumschild, 7 Wis.2d at ,
95 N.W.2d at 820 (same); Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 526, 263 A.2d 129, 136-
37 (1970) (same).
188. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text (viewing choice of law as referencing
only substantive law of chosen state avoids problems of renvoi).
189. See supra note 6 (discussing American courts' acceptance of party autonomy in
contractual choice of law clauses).
[Vol. 43:141
CHOICE OF LA W STIPULATIONS
applicable through the application of unfamiliar choice of law rules, is not
consistent with the concept of party autonomy.190 Unless the stipulation
clearly calls for the application of the chosen state's conflict rules, courts
should not deem the parties to have gambled on the governing law. 92
Finally, since courts honor choice of law stipulations, for the most part,
in the interest of judicial economy, applying the whole law of the chosen
state would be self-defeating. 92 By effectuating a stipulation, a court may
forego choice of law analysis. 93 If the stipulation references the whole law
of another jurisdiction, the forum not only will conduct choice of law
analysis, but will have to deal with what may be quite unfamiliar rules.
94
No saving of time or effort will result, and the court will lose much of the
incentive for accepting stipulations. 95
Accepting the proposition that courts should apply the rules of decision
of the state's laws to which the parties stipulated, 9 6 most of the discussion
regarding choice of law provisions in contracts focuses on the limits of the
parties' recognized autonomy. 97 With respect to litigants' choice of law
stipulations, courts first must determine whether courts should consider
giving effect to the stipulations. '9 With a few exceptions, courts that have
rejected stipulations by litigants have not moved beyond this first important
question. 99
The increasing court congestion in the United States necessitates that
courts elevate considerations of judicial economy. 2 ° Since litigants may ease
190. See supra notes 179-87 and accompanying text (examining Restatement's view that
courts should apply substantive law of state chosen by parties).
191. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text (choice of law stipulations are means
by which parties to contract protect their expectancies under contract).
192. See supra note 12 (choice of law stipulations reduce litigation); see infra notes 193-95
(application of whole law of chosen state does not promote judicial economy).
193. See supra note 12 (choice of law stipulations reduce litigation by allowing courts to
forego traditional choice of law analysis).
194. See Cormack, supra note 184, at 257-58 (concerns of judicial economy necessitate
that judges apply only substantive law of chosen state).
195. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (choice of law stipulations honored in part
because of benefits to judicial economy).
196. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (discussing American courts and
commentators rejection of view that courts should examine choice of law rules of chosen state).
197. See supra notes I and 156-60 (discussing public policy and reasonableness constraints
on choice of law by parties).
198. See infra note 199 (asserting that courts rejecting litigants' choice of law stipulations
did not examine whether stipulated body of law was reasonable or was violative of public
policy).
199. See, e.g., Ezell v. Hayes Oilfield Constr. Co., 693 F.2d 489, 492 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982)
(litigants' choice of law stipulations are no more binding on court than stipulations concerning
content of law), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 79 (1983); System Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games
Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1137 n.4 (3rd Cir. 1977) (absence of authority on point resulted in
rejection of litigants' choice of law stipulation); Consolidated Water Power & Paper Co. v.
Spartan Aircraft Co., 185 F.2d 947, 949 (3d Cir. 1950) (court will not honor choice of law
stipulation if not included in contract).
200. See J. LIEBERMAN, THE Lrr2Gious SOCIETY 3-6 (1981) (asserting that American courts
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the dockets of the courts through choice of law stipulations, courts should
at least pause to consider the benefits of reduction in litigation to the court,
the parties, and the system in general. 20' If a choice of law stipulation
proffered by litigants is reasonable and does not offend any public policy
interests of the forum or any other state, a court should honor the litigants'
choice of law. 202 While courts are not in agreement concerning the validity
.of litigants' choice of law stipulations, 20 3 a shared concern for reducing
litigation should move more courts toward accepting reasonable choice of
law stipulations proffered by litigants in both contract and tort disputes. 204
TYLER BROWN
are filled with increasing volume of lawsuits constituting "legal explosion"); Manning, Hyper-
lexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 767, 767-70 (1977) (asserting that rapid growth
in litigation is damaging to American judicial system).
201. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text (discussing policy reasons supporting
party autonomy in choice of law when included in contractual choice of law clause).
202. See supra notes 1 and 156-60 (discussing reasonableness and public policy constraints
on party autonomy in choice of law).
203. See, e.g., Twohy v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 758 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1985)
(honoring litigants' choice of law stipulation in contract dispute); Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d
489, 495 (7th Cir. 1982) (honoring tort litigants' choice of law stipulation); Ezell v. Hayes
Oilfield Constr. Co., 693 F.2d 489, 492 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting litigants' choice of law
stipulation in contract dispute), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 79 (1983); System Operations, Inc. v.
Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1137 (3d Cir. 1977) (rejecting tort litigants' choice
of law stipulation).
204. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (reduction of litigation is valid concern
for courts).
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